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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, com-
munication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical
world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-
physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific
analysis tools as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be
developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper
proposes a unified framework to analyze the resilience of cyber-
physical systems against attacks cast by an omniscient adversary.
We model cyber-physical systems as linear descriptor systems,
and attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. Despite its simplicity,
our model captures various real-world cyber-physical systems,
and it includes and generalizes many prototypical attacks, in-
cluding stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks.
First, we characterize fundamental limitations of static, dynamic,
and active monitors for attack detection and identification.
Second, we provide constructive algebraic conditions to cast
undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Third, by using the
system interconnection structure, we describe graph-theoretic
conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable
attacks. Finally, we validate our findings through some illustra-
tive examples with different cyber-physical systems, such as a
municipal water supply network and two electrical power grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems arise from the tight integration of
physical processes, computational resources, and communi-
cation capabilities. More precisely, processing units monitor
and control physical processes by means of sensors and actu-
ators networks. Examples of cyber-physical systems include
transportation networks, power generation and distribution
networks, water and gas distribution networks, and advanced
communication systems. Due to the crucial role of cyber-
physical systems in everyday life, cyber-physical security
needs to be promptly addressed.
Besides failures and attacks on the physical infrastructure,
cyber-physical systems are also prone to cyber attacks on their
data management and communication layer. Recent studies
and real-world incidents have demonstrated the inability of
existing security methods to ensure a safe and reliable func-
tionality of cyber-physical infrastructures against unforeseen
failures and, possibly, external attacks [1]–[4]. The protection
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of critical infrastructures is, as of today, one of the main focus
of the Department of Homeland Security [5].
Concerns about security of control systems are not new,
as the numerous manuscripts on systems fault detection,
isolation, and recovery testify; see for example [6], [7]. Cyber-
physical systems, however, suffer from specific vulnerabilities
which do not affect classical control systems, and for which
appropriate detection and identification techniques need to
be developed. For instance, the reliance on communication
networks and standard communication protocols to transmit
measurements and control packets increases the possibility
of intentional and worst-case (cyber) attacks against physical
plants. On the other hand, information security methods,
such as authentication, access control, message integrity, and
cryptography methods, appear inadequate for a satisfactory
protection of cyber-physical systems. Indeed, these security
methods do not exploit the compatibility of the measurements
with the underlying physical process and control mechanism,
which are the ultimate objective of a protection scheme [8].
Moreover, such information security methods are not effective
against insider attacks carried out by authorized entities, as in
the famous Maroochy Water Breach case [3], and they also fail
against attacks targeting directly the physical dynamics [9].
Related work. The analysis of vulnerabilities of cyber-
physical systems to external attacks has received increasing
attention in the last years. The general approach has been
to study the effect of specific attacks against particular sys-
tems. For instance, in [10] deception and denial of service
attacks against a networked control system are introduced,
and, for the latter ones, a countermeasure based on semi-
definite programming is proposed. Deception attacks refer to
the possibility of compromising the integrity of control packets
or measurements, and they are cast by altering the behavior
of sensors and actuators. Denial of service attacks, instead,
compromise the availability of resources by, for instance, jam-
ming the communication channel. In [11] false data injection
attacks against static state estimators are introduced. False
data injection attacks are specific deception attacks in the
context of static estimators. It is shown that undetectable false
data injection attacks can be designed even when the attacker
has limited resources. In a similar fashion, stealthy deception
attacks against the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
system are studied, among others, in [12], [13]. In [14] the
effect of replay attacks on a control system is discussed.
Replay attacks are cast by hijacking the sensors, recording
the readings for a certain amount of time, and repeating such
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2readings while injecting an exogenous signal into the system.
It is shown that this type of attack can be detected by injecting
a signal unknown to the attacker into the system. In [15]
the effect of covert attacks against networked control sys-
tems is investigated. Specifically, a parameterized decoupling
structure allows a covert agent to alter the behavior of the
physical plant while remaining undetected from the original
controller. In [16] a resilient control problem is studied, in
which control packets transmitted over a network are corrupted
by a human adversary. A receding-horizon Stackelberg control
law is proposed to stabilize the control system despite the
attack. Recently the problem of estimating the state of a linear
system with corrupted measurements has been studied [17].
More precisely, the maximum number of faulty sensors that
can be tolerated is characterized, and a decoding algorithm is
proposed to detect corrupted measurements. Finally, security
issues of some specific cyber-physical systems have received
considerable attention, such as power networks [1], [2], [9],
[12], [18]–[22], linear networks with misbehaving components
[23], [24], and water networks [3], [13], [15], [25].
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows. First, we describe a unified modeling framework for
cyber-physical systems and attacks. Motivated by existing
cyber-physical systems and proposed attack scenarios, we
model a cyber-physical system under attack as a descriptor
system subject to unknown inputs affecting the state and
the measurements. For our model, we define the notions
of detectability and identifiability of an attack by its effect
on output measurements. Informed by the classic work on
geometric control theory [26], our framework includes the
deterministic static detection problem considered in [11], [12],
and the prototypical deception and denial of service [10],
stealth [18], (dynamic) false-data injection [27], replay [14],
and covert attacks [15] as special cases. Second, we show
the fundamental limitations of static, dynamic, and active
detection and identification procedures. Specifically, we show
that static detection procedures are unable to detect any
attack affecting the dynamics, and that attacks corrupting
the measurements can be easily designed to be undetectable.
On the contrary, we show that undetectability in a dynamic
setting is much harder to achieve for an attacker. Specifi-
cally, a cyber-physical attack is undetectable if and only if
the attackers’ signal excites uniquely the zero dynamics of
the input/output system. Additionally, we show that active
monitors capable of injecting test signals are as powerful
as dynamic (passive) monitors, since an attacker can design
undetectable and unidentifiable attacks without knowing the
signal injected by the monitor into the system. This analysis
bring us also to the conclusion that undetectable attacks can
be cast even without knowledge of system noise. Third, we
provide a graph theoretic characterization of undetectable
attacks. Specifically, we borrow some tools from the theory of
structured systems, and we identify conditions on the system
interconnection structure for the existence of undetectable
attacks. These conditions are generic, in the sense that they
hold for almost all numerical systems with the same structure,
and they can be efficiently verified. As a complementary result,
we extend a result of [28] on structural left-invertibility to
regular descriptor systems. Fourth and finally, we illustrate the
potential impact of our theoretical findings through compelling
examples. In particular, we design (i) an undetectable state
attack to destabilize the WSSC 3-machine 6-bus power system,
(ii) an undetectable output attack for the IEEE 14 bus system,
and (iii) an undetectable state and output attack to steal water
from a reservoir of the EPANET network model 3. Through
these examples we show the advantages of dynamic monitors
against static ones, and we provide insight on the design of
attacks.
Paper organization. The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II presents some examples of cyber-
physical systems. Section III contains our models of cyber-
physical systems, attacks, and monitors. Our main results are
presented in Section IV and in Section V. In particular, in
Section IV we describe the fundamental limitations of static,
dynamic, and active detectors, and we provide constructive
algebraic conditions for the existence of undetectable and
unidentifiable attacks. In Section V, instead, we derive graph-
theoretic conditions for the existence of undetectable and
unidentifiable attacks. Finally, Section VI and Section VII con-
tain, respectively, our illustrative examples and our conclusion.
II. EXAMPLES OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
We now motivate our study by introducing important cyber-
physical systems requiring advanced security mechanisms.
A. Power networks
Future power grids will combine physical dynamics with a
sophisticated coordination infrastructure. The cyber-physical
security of the grid has been identified as an issue of primary
concern [1], [2], which has recently attracted the interest of the
control and power systems communities, see [12], [18]–[22].
We adopt the small-signal version of the classical structure-
preserving power network model; see [19], [20] for a de-
tailed derivation from the full nonlinear structure-preserving
power network model. Consider a connected power network
consisting of n generators {g1, . . . , gn} and m load buses
{bn+1, . . . , bn+m}. The interconnection structure of the power
network is encoded by a connected susceptance-weighted
graph. The generators gi and buses bi are the vertex set of
this graph, and the edges are the transmission lines {bi, bj}
weighted by the susceptance between buses bi and bj , as
well as the connections {gi, bi} weighted by the transient
susceptance between generator gi and its adjacent bus bi.
The Laplacian associated with the susceptance-weighted graph
is the symmetric susceptance matrix L =
[ Lgg Lgl
Llg Lll
]
∈
R(n+m)×(n+m), where the first n rows are associated with
the generators and the last m rows correspond to the buses.
The dynamic model of the power network isI 0 00 Mg 0
0 0 0
 δ˙(t)ω˙(t)
θ˙(t)
=−
 0 −I 0Lgg Dg Lgl
Llg 0 Lll
δ(t)ω(t)
θ(t)
+
 0Pω(t)
Pθ(t)
,
(1)
where δ(t) ∈ Rn and ω(t) ∈ Rn denote the generator rotor
angles and frequencies, and θ(t) ∈ Rm are the voltage angles
3at the buses. The terms Mg and Dg are the diagonal matrices of
the generator inertial and damping coefficients, and the inputs
Pω(t) and Pθ(t) are due to known changes in mechanical input
power to the generators or real power demand at the loads.
B. Mass transport networks
Mass transport networks are prototypical examples of cyber-
physical systems modeled by differential-algebraic equations,
such as gas transmission and distribution networks [29], large-
scale process engineering plants [30], and water networks.
Examples of water networks include open channel flows [31]
for irrigation purposes and municipal water networks [32],
[33]. The vulnerability of open channel networks to cyber-
physical attacks has been studied in [13], [15], and municipal
water networks are also known to be susceptible to attacks on
the hydraulics [3] and biochemical contamination threats [25].
We focus on the hydraulics of a municipal water distribution
network, as modeled in [32], [33]. The water network can
be modeled as a directed graph with node set consisting of
reservoirs, junctions, and storage tanks, and with edge set
given by pipes, pumps, and valves that are used to convey
water from source points to consumers. The key variables
are the pressure head hi at each node i in the network as
well as the flows Qij from node i to j. The hydraulic model
governing the network dynamics includes constant reservoir
heads, flow balance equations at junctions and tanks, and
pressure difference equations along all edges:
reservoir i : hi = hireservoir = constant ,
junction i : di =
∑
j→iQji −
∑
i→kQik ,
tank i : Aih˙i =
∑
j→iQji −
∑
i→kQik ,
pipe (i, j) : Qij = Qij(hi − hj) ,
pump (i, j) : hj − hi = +∆hijpump = constant ,
valve (i, j) : hj − hi = −∆hijvalve = constant .
(2)
Here di is the demand at junction i, Ai is the (constant) cross-
sectional area of storage tank i, and the notation “j → i”
denotes the set of nodes j connected to node i. The flow Qij
depends on the pressure drop hi − hj along pipe according
to the Hazen-Williams equation Qij(hi − hj) = gij |hi −
hj |1/1.85−1 · (hi−hj), where gij > 0 is the pipe conductance.
Other interesting examples of cyber-physical systems cap-
tured by our modeling framework are sensor networks, dy-
namic Leontief models of multi-sector economies, mixed gas-
power energy networks, and large-scale control systems.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS, MONITORS, AND ATTACKS
In this section we model cyber-physical systems under
attack as linear time-invariant descriptor systems subject to
unknown inputs. This modeling framework is very general
and includes most of the existing cyber-physical models,
attacks, and fault scenarios. Indeed, as shown in Section II,
many interesting real-world cyber-physical systems contain
conserved physical quantities leading to differential-algebraic
system descriptions, and, as we show later, most attack and
fault scenarios can be modeled by additive inputs affecting the
state and the measurements.
Model of cyber-physical systems under attack. We consider
the linear time-invariant descriptor system1
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t),
(3)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, y(t) ∈ Rp, E ∈ Rn×n, A ∈ Rn×n,
B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n, and D ∈ Rp×m. Here the
matrix E is possibly singular, and the input terms Bu(t)
and Du(t) are unknown signals describing disturbances af-
fecting the plant. Besides reflecting the genuine failure of
systems components, these disturbances model the effect of
an attack against the cyber-physical system (see below for
our attack model). For notational convenience and without
affecting generality, we assume that each state and output
variable can be independently compromised by an attacker.
Thus, we let B =
[
I, 0
]
and D =
[
0, I
]
be partitioned
into identity and zero matrices of appropriate dimensions,
and, accordingly, u(t) =
[
ux(t)
T, uy(t)
T
]T
. Hence, the attack
(Bu(t), Du(t)) = (ux(t), uy(t)) can be classified as state
attack affecting the system dynamics and as output attack
corrupting directly the measurements vector.
The attack signal t 7→ u(t) ∈ Rn+p depends upon the
specific attack strategy. In the presence of k ∈ N0, k ≤ n+ p,
attackers indexed by the attack set K ⊆ {1, . . . , n + p} only
and all the entries K of u(t) are nonzero over time. To
underline this sparsity relation, we sometimes use uK(t) to
denote the attack mode, that is the subvector of u(t) indexed
by K. Accordingly, the pair (BK , DK), where BK and DK
are the submatrices of B and D with columns in K, to
denote the attack signature. Hence, Bu(t) = BKuK(t), and
Du(t) = DKuK(t). Since the matrix E may be singular, we
make the following assumptions on system (3):
(A1) the pair (E,A) is regular, that is, det(sE−A) does not
vanish identically,
(A2) the initial condition x(0) ∈ Rn is consistent, that is,
(Ax(0) +Bu(0)) ⊥ Ker(ET) = 0; and
(A3) the input signal u(t) is smooth.
The regularity assumption (A1) assures the existence of a
unique solution x(t) to (3). Assumptions (A2) and (A3)
simplify the technical presentation in this paper since they
guarantee smoothness of the state trajectory x(t) and the
measurements y(t); see [34, Lemma 2.5] for further details.
The degree of smoothness in assumption (A3) depends on
the index of (E,A), see [35, Theorem 2.42], and continuity
of u(t) is sufficient for the index-one examples presented in
Section II. In Section IV-E we discuss the results in this paper
if assumptions (A2) and (A3) are dropped.
Model of static, dynamic, and active monitors. A monitor
is a pair (Φ, γ(t)), where Φ : Λ → Ψ is an algorithm,
and γ : R 7→ Rn+p is a signal. In particular, Λ is the
1The results stated in this paper for continuous-time descriptor systems hold
also for discrete-time descriptor systems and nonsingular systems. Moreover,
we neglect the presence of known inputs, since, due to the linearity of system
(3), they do not affect our results on the detectability and identifiability of
unknown input attacks.
4algorithm input to be specified later, Ψ = {ψ1, ψ2}, with
ψ1 ∈ {True,False} and ψ2 ⊆ {1, . . . , n+ p}, is the algorithm
output, and (Bγ(t), Dγ(t)) is an auxiliary input injected by
the monitor into the system (3). In this work we consider the
following classes of monitors for the system (3).
Definition 1: (Static monitor) A static monitor is a monitor
with γ(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ R≥0, and Λ = {C, y(t) ∀t ∈ N}.
Note that static monitors do not exploit relations among
measurements taken at different time instants. An example of
static monitor is the bad data detector [36].
Definition 2: (Dynamic monitor) A dynamic monitor is
a monitor with γ(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ R≥0, and Λ =
{E,A,C, y(t) ∀t ∈ R≥0}.
Differently from static monitors, dynamic monitors have
knowledge of the system dynamics generating y(t) and may
exploit temporal relations among different measurements. The
filters defined in [21] are examples of dynamic monitors.
Definition 3: (Active monitor) An active monitor is a
monitor with γ(t) 6= 0 for some t ∈ R≥0, and Λ =
{E,A,C, y(t) ∀t ∈ R≥0}.
Active monitors are dynamic monitors with the ability of
modifying the system dynamics through an input. An example
of active monitor is presented in [14] to detect replay attacks.
The objective of a monitor is twofold:
Definition 4: (Attack detection) A nonzero attack
(BKuK(t), DKuK(t)) is detected by a monitor if ψ1 = True.
Definition 5: (Attack identification) A nonzero attack
(BKuK(t), DKuK(t)) is identified by a monitor if ψ2 = K.
An attack is called undetectable (respectively unidentifiable)
by a monitor if it fails to be detected (respectively identified)
by every monitor in the same class. Of course, an undetectable
attack is also unidentifiable, since it cannot be distinguished
from the zero attack. By extension, an attack set K is unde-
tectable (respectively unidentifiable) if there exists an unde-
tectable (respectively unidentifiable) attack (BKuK , DKuK).
Model of attacks. In this work we consider colluding omni-
scient attackers with the ability of altering the cyber-physical
dynamics through exogenous inputs. In particular we let the
attack (Bu(t), Du(t)) in (3) be designed based on knowledge
of the system structure and parameters E,A,C, and the full
state x(t) at all times. Additionally, attackers have unlimited
computation capabilities, and their objective is to disrupt the
physical state or the measurements while avoiding detection.
Remark 1: (Existing attack strategies as subcases) The
following prototypical attacks can be modeled and analyzed
through our theoretical framework:
(i) stealth attacks defined in [18] correspond to output
attacks compatible with the measurements equation;
(ii) replay attacks defined in [14] are state and output
attacks which affect the system dynamics and reset the
measurements;
(iii) covert attacks defined in [15] are closed-loop replay
attacks, where the output attack is chosen to cancel out
the effect on the measurements of the state attack; and
(iv) (dynamic) false-data injection attacks defined in [27] are
output attacks rendering an unstable mode (if any) of the
system unobservable.
+ y(t)
Du(t)
Cx(t)
Cu˜(t)
(a) Static stealth attack
(sE −A)−1 Cx(t) + y(t)x(0)
Bu¯(t)
Du(t)
x˜(0) +−(sE −A)−1 C
(b) Replay attack
(sE −A)−1 C
x(t)
+ y(t)
x(0)
Bu¯(t)
Du(t)
−
(sE −A)−1 C
(c) Covert attack
(sE −A)−1 Cx(t) + y(t)x(0)
Du(t)
C(sE −A)−1￿(s− p)− 1￿
(d) Dynamic false data injection
Fig. 1. A block diagram illustration of prototypical attacks is here
reported. In Fig. 1(a) the attacker corrupts the measurements y(t) with the
signal DKuK(t) ∈ Im(C). Notice that in this attack the dynamics of the
system are not considered. In Fig. 1(a) the attacker affects the output so that
y(t) = y(x(0), [u¯TK u
T
K ]
T, t) = y(x˜(0), 0, t). The covert attack in Fig. 1(c)
is a feedback version of the replay attack, and it can be explained analogously.
In Fig. 1(d) the attack is such that the unstable pole p is made unobservable.
A possible implementation of the above attacks in our model
is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
To conclude this section we remark that the examples
presented in Section II are captured in our framework. In
particular, classical power networks failures modeled by ad-
ditive inputs include sudden change in the mechanical power
input to generators, lines outage, and sensors failure; see [21]
for a detailed discussion. Analogously, for a water network,
faults modeled by additive inputs include leakages, variation in
demand, and failures of pumps and sensors. Possible cyber-
physical attacks in both power and water networks include
comprising measurements [11]–[13] and attacks on the control
architecture or the physical state itself [2], [3], [9], [22].
IV. LIMITATIONS OF STATIC, DYNAMIC AND ACTIVE
MONITORS FOR DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
The objective of this section is to highlight fundamental
detection and identification limitations of static, dynamic, and
active monitors. In particular, we show that the performance
of widely used static monitors can be greatly improved by
exploiting the system dynamics. On the other hand, the pos-
sibility of injecting monitoring signals does not improve the
detection capabilities of a (passive) dynamic monitor.
Observe that a cyber-physical attack is undetectable if there
exists a normal operating condition of the system under which
the output would be the same as under the perturbation due to
the attacker. Let y(x0, u, t) be the output sequence generated
from the initial state x0 under the attack signal u(t).
Lemma 4.1: (Undetectable attack) For the linear descriptor
system (3), the attack (BKuK , DKuK) is undetectable by a
static monitor if and only if y(x1, uK , t) = y(x2, 0, t) for
some initial condition x1, x2 ∈ Rn and for t ∈ N0. If the
same holds for t ∈ R≥0, then the attack is also undetectable
by a dynamic monitor.
Lemma 4.1 follows from the fact that our monitors are
deterministic, so that y(x1, uK , t) and y(x2, 0, t) lead to the
same output ψ1. A more general concern than detectability is
identifiability of attackers, that is, the possibility to distinguish
5from measurements between the action of two distinct attacks.
We quantify the strength of an attack through the cardinality of
the attack set. Since an attacker can independently compromise
any state variable or measurement, every subset of the states
and measurements of fixed cardinality is a possible attack set.
Lemma 4.2: (Unidentifiable attack) For the linear descrip-
tor system (3), the attack (BKuK , DKuK) is unidentifiable by
a static monitor if and only if y(x1, uK , t) = y(x2, uR, t) for
some initial condition x1, x2 ∈ Rn, attack (BRuR, DRuR)
with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K, and for t ∈ N0. If the same
holds for t ∈ R≥0, then the attack is also unidentifiable by a
dynamic monitor.
Lemma 4.2 follows analogously to Lemma 4.1. We now
elaborate on the above lemmas to derive fundamental detection
and identification limitations for the considered monitors.
A. Fundamental limitations of static monitors
Following Lemma 4.1, an attack is undetectable by a static
monitor if and only if, for all t ∈ N0, there exists a vector
ξ(t) such that y(t) = Cξ(t). Notice that this condition is
compatible with [11], where an attack is detected if and only
if the residual r(t) = y(t)−C˜xˆ(t) is nonzero for some t ∈ N0,
where xˆ(t) = C†y(t). In the following, let ‖v‖0 denote the
number of nonzero components of the vector v.
Theorem 4.3: (Static detectability of cyber-physical at-
tacks) For the cyber-physical descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is undetectable by a static monitor;
(ii) there exists an attack mode uK(t) satisfying, for some
x(t) and at every t ∈ N0,
Cx(t) +DKuK(t) = 0. (4)
Moreover, there exists an attack set K, with |K| = k ∈ N0,
undetectable by a static monitor if and only if there exist x ∈
Rn such that ‖Cx‖0 = k.
Before presenting a proof of the above theorem, we high-
light that a necessary and sufficient condition for the equation
(4) to be satisfied is that DKuK(t) = uy,K(t) ∈ Im(C) at
all times t ∈ N0, where uy,K(t) is the vector of the last p
components of uK(t). Hence, statement (ii) in Theorem 4.3
implies that no state attack can be detected by a static detection
procedure, and that an undetectable output attack exists if and
only if Im(DK) ∩ Im(C) 6= {0}.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: As previously discussed, the attack
K is undetectable by a static monitor if and only if for each
t ∈ N there exists x(t), and uK(t) such that
r(t) = y(t)− CC†y(t) = (I − CC†) (Cx(t) +DKuK(t))
vanishes. Consequently, r(t) = (I − CC†)DKuK(t), and the
attack set K is undetectable if and only if DKuK(t) ∈ Im(C),
which is equivalent to statement (ii). The last necessary and
sufficient condition in the theorem follows from (ii), and the
fact that every output variable can be attacked independently
of each other since D =
[
0, I
]
.
We now focus on the static identification problem. Follow-
ing Lemma 4.2, the following result can be asserted.
Theorem 4.4: (Static identification of cyber-physical at-
tacks) For the cyber-physical descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is unidentifiable by a static monitor;
(ii) there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K,
and attack modes uK(t), uR(t) satisfying, for some x(t)
and at every t ∈ N0,
Cx(t) +DK (uK(t) + uR(t)) = 0.
Moreover, there exists an attack set K, with |K| = k ∈ N0,
unidentifiable by a static monitor if and only if there exists
an attack set K¯, with |K¯| ≤ 2k, which is undetectable by a
static monitor.
Similar to the fundamental limitations of static detectability
in Theorem 4.3, Theorem 4.4 implies that, for instance, state
attacks cannot be identified and that an undetectable output
attack of cardinality k exists if and only if Im(DK¯)∩Im(C) 6=
{0}, for some attack set K¯ with |K¯| ≤ 2k.
Proof of Theorem 4.4: Due to linearity of the system (3),
the unidentifiability condition in Lemma 4.2 is equivalent to
y(xK − xR, uK − uR, t) = 0, for some initial conditions xK ,
xR, and attack modes uK(t), uR(t). The equivalence between
statements (i) and (ii) follows. The last statement follows from
Theorem 4.3.
B. Fundamental limitations of dynamic monitors
As opposed to a static monitor, a dynamic monitor checks
for the presence of attacks at every time t ∈ R≥0. Intuitively,
a dynamic monitor is harder to mislead than a static monitor.
The following theorem formalizes this expected result.
Theorem 4.5: (Dynamic detectability of cyber-physical at-
tacks) For the cyber-physical descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is undetectable by a dynamic monitor;
(ii) there exists an attack mode uK(t) satisfying, for some
x(0) and for every t ∈ R≥0,
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +BKuK(t) ,
0 = Cx(t) +DKuK(t) ;
(iii) there exist s ∈ C, g ∈ R|K|, and x ∈ Rn, with x 6= 0,
such that (sE −A)x−BKg = 0 and Cx+DKg = 0.
Moreover, there exists an attack set K, with |K| = k,
undetectable by a dynamic monitor if and only if there exist
s ∈ C and x ∈ Rn such that ‖(sE −A)x‖0 + ‖Cx‖0 = k.
Before proving Theorem 4.5, some comments are in order.
First, differently from the static case, state attacks can be
detected in the dynamic case. Second, in order to mislead a
dynamic monitor an attacker needs to inject a signal which
is consistent with the system dynamics at every instant of
time. Hence, as opposed to the static case, the condition
DKuK(t) = uy,K(t) ∈ Im(C) needs to be satisfied for every
t ∈ R≥0, and it is only necessary for the undetectability of
an output attack. Indeed, for instance, state attacks can be
detected even though they automatically satisfy the condition
DKuK(t) = 0 ∈ Im(C). Third and finally, according to
6the last statement of Theorem 4.5, the existence of invariant
zeros2 for the system (E,A,BK , C,DK) is equivalent to
the existence of undetectable attacks. As a consequence, a
dynamic monitor performs better than a static monitor, while
requiring, possibly, fewer measurements. We refer to Section
VI-B for an illustrative example of this last statement.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: By Lemma 4.1 and linearity of
the system (7), the attack mode uK(t) is undetectable by
a dynamic monitor if and only if there exists x0 such that
y(x0, uK , t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0, that is, if and only if
the system (3) features zero dynamics. Hence, statements (i)
and (ii) are equivalent. For a linear descriptor system with
smooth input and consistent initial condition, the existence of
zero dynamics is equivalent to the existence of invariant zeros
[34, Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.4]. The equivalence of
statements (ii) and (iii) follows. The last statement follows
from (iii), and the fact that B =
[
I, 0
]
and D =
[
0, I
]
.
We now consider the identification problem.
Theorem 4.6: (Dynamic identifiability of cyber-physical
attacks) For the cyber-physical descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is unidentifiable by a dynamic monitor;
(ii) there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K,
and attack modes uK(t), uR(t) satisfying, for some x(0)
and for every t ∈ R≥0,
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +BKuK(t) +BRuR(t) ,
0 = Cx(t) +DKuK(t) +DRuR(t) ;
(iii) there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K,
s ∈ C, gK ∈ R|K|, gR ∈ R|R|, and x ∈ Rn, with
x 6= 0, such that (sE −A)x−BKgK −BRgR = 0 and
Cx+DKgK +DRgR = 0.
Moreover, there exists an attack set K, with |K| = k ∈ N0,
unidentifiable by a dynamic monitor if and only if there exists
an attack set K¯, with |K¯| ≤ 2k, which is undetectable by a
dynamic monitor.
Proof: Notice that, because of the linearity of the system
(3), the unidentifiability condition in Lemma 4.2 is equivalent
to the condition y(xK − xR, uK − uR, t) = 0, for some
initial conditions xK , xR, and attack modes uK(t), uR(t). The
equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) follows. Finally,
the last two statements follow from Theorem 4.5, and the fact
that B =
[
I, 0
]
and D =
[
0, I
]
.
In other words, the existence of an unidentifiable attack set
K of cardinality k is equivalent to the existence of invariant
zeros for the system (E,A,BK¯ , C,DK¯), for some attack set
K¯ with |K¯| ≤ 2k. We conclude this section with the following
remarks. The existence condition in Theorem 3.4 is hard to
verify because of its combinatorial complexity: in order to
check if there exists an unidentifiable attack set K, with
|K| = k, one needs to certify the absence of invariant zeros for
all possible 2k-dimensional attack sets. Thus, a conservative
2For the system (E,A,BK , C,DK), the value s ∈ C is an invariant zero if
there exists x ∈ Rn, with x 6= 0, g ∈ R|K|, such that (sE−A)x−BKg = 0
and Cx+DKg = 0.
verification scheme requires
(
n+p
2k
)
tests. In Section V we
present intuitive graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of
undetectable and unidentifiable attack sets for a given sparsity
pattern of the system matrices and generic system parameters.
Finally, Theorem 4.6 includes as a special case Proposition 4
in [17], which considers exclusively output attacks.
C. Fundamental limitations of active monitors
An active monitor uses a control signal (unknown to the
attacker) to reveal the presence of attacks; see [14] for the case
of replay attacks. In the presence of an active monitor with
input signal w(t) = [wTx (t) w
T
y (t)]
T, the system (3) reads as
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +BKuK(t) + wx(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) +DKuK(t) + wy(t).
Although the attacker is unaware of the signal w(t), active
and dynamic monitors share the same limitations.
Theorem 4.7: (Limitations of active monitors) For the
cyber-physical descriptor system (3), let w(t) be an additive
signal injected by an active monitor. The existence of unde-
tectable (respectively unidentifiable) attacks does not depend
upon the signal w(t). Moreover, undetectable (respectively
unidentifiable) attacks can be designed independently of w(t).
Proof: For the system (3), let u(t) be the attack mode,
and let w(t) be the monitoring input. Let y(x, u, w, t) denotes
the output generated by the inputs u(t) and w(t) with initial
condition x = x1 + x2. Observe that, because of the linearity
of (3), we have y(x, u, w, t) = y(x1, u, 0, t) + y(x2, 0, w, t),
with consistent initial conditions x1 and x2. Then, an attack
u(t) is undetectable if and only if y(x, u, w, t) = y(x¯, 0, w, t),
or equivalently y(x1, u, 0, t) + y(x2, 0, w, t) = y(x¯1, 0, 0, t) +
y(x2, 0, w, t), for some initial conditions x and x¯ = x¯1 +
x2. The statement follows, since, from the equality above, the
detectability of u(t) does not depend upon w(t).
As a consequence of Theorem 4.7, the existence of un-
detectable attacks is independent of the presence of known
control signals. Therefore, in a worst-case scenario, active
monitors are as powerful as dynamic monitors. Since replay
attacks are detectable by an active monitor [14], Theorem 4.7
shows that replay attacks are not worst-case attacks.
Remark 2: (Undetectable attacks in the presence of state
and measurements noise) The input w(t) in Theorem 4.7 may
represent sensors and actuators noise. In this case, Theorem
4.7 states that the existence of undetectable attacks for a noise-
free system implies the existence of undetectable attacks for
the same system driven by noise. The converse does not hold,
since attackers may remain undetected by injecting a signal
compatible with the noise statistics. 
D. Specific results for index-one singular systems
For many interesting real-world descriptor systems, includ-
ing the examples in Section II-A and II-B, the algebraic system
equations can be solved explicitly, and the descriptor system
(3) can be reduced to a nonsingular state space system. For
this reason, this section presents specific results for the case of
7index-one systems [37]. In this case, without loss of generality,
we assume the system (3) to be written in the canonical form[
E11 0
0 0
] [
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
x1
x2
]
+
[
B1
B2
]
uK(t),
y(t) =
[
C1 C2
] [x1
x2
]
+DKuK(t),
(5)
where E11 is nonsingular and A22 is nonsingular. Conse-
quently, the state x1 and x2 are referred to as dynamic state
and algebraic state, respectively. The algebraic state can be
expressed via the dynamic state and the attack mode as
x2(t) = −A−122 A21x1(t)−A−122 B2uK(t). (6)
The elimination of the algebraic state x2 in the descriptor
system (5) leads to the nonsingular state space system
x˙1 = E
−1
11
(
A11 −A12A−122 A21
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜
x1(t)
+ E−111
(
B1 −A12A−122 B2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜K
uK(t), (7)
y(t) =
(
C1 − C2A−122 A21
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜
x1(t) +
(
DK − C2A−122 B2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D˜K
uK(t).
This reduction of the algebraic states is known as Kron
reduction in the literature on power networks and circuit theory
[38]. Hence, we refer to (7) as the Kron-reduced system.
Clearly, for any state trajectory x1(t) of the Kron-reduced
system (7), the corresponding state trajectory [xT1 (t) x
T
2 (t)]
T
of the (non-reduced) cyber-physical descriptor system (3) can
be recovered by identity (6) and given knowledge of the input
uK(t). The following subtle issues are easily visible in the
Kron-reduced system (6). First, a state attack affects directly
the output y(t), provided that C2A−122 B2uK(t) 6= 0. Second,
since the matrix A−122 is generally fully populated, an attack on
a single algebraic component can affect not only the locally
attacked state or its vicinity but larger parts of the system.
According to the transformations in (7), for each attack set
K, the attack signature (BK , DK) is mapped to the corre-
sponding signature (B˜K , D˜K) in the Kron-reduced system. As
an apparent disadvantage, the sparsity pattern of the original
(non-reduced) cyber-physical descriptor system (3) is lost in
the Kron-reduced representation (7), and so is, possibly, the
physical interpretation of the state and the direct representation
of system components. However, as we show in the following
lemma, the notions of detectability and identifiability of an
attack set K defined for the original descriptor system (3)
are equivalent for the Kron-reduced system (7). This property
renders the low-dimensional and nonsingular Kron-reduced
system (7) attractive from a computational point of view to
design attack detection and identification monitors; see [39].
Lemma 4.8: (Equivalence of detectability and identifiabil-
ity under Kron reduction) For the cyber-physical descriptor
system (3), the attack set K is detectable (respectively identi-
fiable) if and only if it is detectable (respectively identifiable)
for the associated Kron-reduced system (7).
Proof: The lemma follows from the fact that the input and
initial condition to output map for the system (3) coincides
with the corresponding map for the Kron-reduced system (7)
and equation (6). Indeed, according to Theorem 4.5, the attack
set K is undetectable if and only if there exist s ∈ C, g ∈
R|K|, and x = [xT1 xT2 ]T ∈ Rn, with x 6= 0, such that
(sE −A)x−BKg = 0 and Cx+DKg = 0 .
Equivalently, by eliminating the algebraic constraints as in (6),
the attack set K is undetectable if and only if the conditons
(sI − A˜)x1 − B˜Kg = 0 and C˜x1 + D˜Kg = 0
are satisfied together with x2 = −A−122 A21x1 − A−122 B2g.
Notice that the latter equation is always satisfied due to
the consistency assumption (A2), and the equivalence of
detectability of the attack set K follows. The equivalence of
attack identifiability follows by analogous arguments.
E. Attack detection and identification in presence of inconsis-
tent initial conditions and impulsive attack signals
We now discuss the case of non-smooth attack signal and
inconsistent initial condition. If the consistency assumption
(A3) is dropped, then discontinuities in the state x(t ↓ 0) may
affect the measurements y(t ↓ 0). For instance for index-one
systems, an inconsistent initial condition leads to an initial
jump for the algebraic variable x2(t ↓ 0) to obey equation (6).
Consequently, the inconsistent initial value [0T x2(0)T]T ∈
Ker(E) cannot be recovered through measurements.
Assumption (A4) requires the attack signal to be sufficiently
smooth such that x(t) and y(t) are at least continuous.
Suppose that assumption (A4) is dropped and the input u(t)
belongs to the class of impulsive smooth distributions Cimp =
Csmooth∪Cp-imp, that is, loosely speaking, the class of functions
given by the linear combination of a smooth function on R≥0
(denoted by Csmooth) and Dirac impulses and their derivatives
at t = 0 (denoted by Cp-imp), see [34], [35, Section 2.4]. In this
case, an attacker commanding an impulsive input u(0) ∈ Cimp
can reset the initial state x(0) and, possibly, evade detection.
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs can be
formalized as follows. Let Vc be the subspace of points
x0 ∈ Rn of consistent initial conditions for which there exists
an input u ∈ Cmsmooth and a state trajectory x ∈ Cnsmooth to the
descriptor system (3) such that y(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0. Let
Vd (respectively W) be the subspace of points x0 ∈ Rn for
which there exists an input u ∈ Cn+pimp (respectively u ∈ Cn+pp-imp)
and a state trajectory x ∈ Cnimp (respectively x ∈ Cnp-imp) to the
descriptor system (3) such that y(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0. The
output-nulling subspace Vd can be decomposed as follows:
Lemma 4.9: (Decomposition of output-nulling space [34,
Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.4])) Vd = Vc+W+ Ker(E).
In words, from an initial condition x(0) ∈ Vd the output can
be nullified by a smooth input or by an impulsive input (with
consistent or inconsistent initial conditions in Ker(E)).
In this work we focus on the smooth output-nulling sub-
space Vc, which is exactly space of zero dynamics identified in
Theorems 4.5 and 4.6. Hence, by Lemma 4.9, for inconsistent
initial conditions, the results presented in this section are valid
only for strictly positive times t > 0. On the other hand, if an
attacker is capable of injecting impulsive signals, then it can
avoid detection for initial conditions x(0) ∈ W .
8V. GRAPH THEORETIC DETECTABILITY CONDITIONS
In this section we characterize undetectable attacks against
cyber-physical systems from a structural perspective. In par-
ticular we will derive detectability conditions based upon a
connectivity property of a graph associated with the system.
For ease of notation, we now drop the subscript K from BK ,
DK , and uK(t).
A. Preliminary notions
We start by recalling some useful facts about structured
systems and structural properties [26], [40]. Let a structure
matrix [M ] be a matrix in which each entry is either a fixed
zero or an indeterminate parameter. The system
[E]x˙(t) = [A]x(t) + [B]u(t),
y(t) = [C]x(t) + [D]u(t).
(8)
is called structured system, and it is sometimes referred to
with the tuple ([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) of structure matrices.
A system (E,A,B,C,D) is an admissible realization of
([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) if it can be obtained from the latter
by fixing the indeterminate entries at some particular value.
Two systems are structurally equivalent if they are both an
admissible realization of the same structured system. Let d
be the number of indeterminate entries of a structured system
altogether. By collecting the indeterminate parameters into a
vector, an admissible realization is mapped to a point in the
Euclidean space Rd. A property which can be asserted on a
dynamical system is called structural if, informally, it holds
for almost all admissible realizations. To be more precise,
we say that a property is structural if and only if the set of
admissible realizations satisfying such property forms a dense
subset of the parameters space.3 For instance, left-invertibility
of a nonsingular system is a structural property with respect
to Rd [41].
Consider the structured cyber-physical system (8). It is often
the case that, for the tuple (E,A,B,C,D) to be an admissible
realization of (8), the numerical entries need to satisfy certain
algebraic relations. For instance, for (E,A,B,C,D) to be an
admissible power network realization, the matrices E and A
need to be of the form (1). Let S ⊆ Rd be the admissible
parameter space. We make the following assumption:
(A4) the admissible parameters space S is a polytope of Rd,
that is, S = {x ∈ Rd : Mx ≥ 0} for some matrix M .
It should be noticed that assumption (A4) is automatically
verified for the case of power networks [20, Lemma 3.1].
Unfortunately, if the admissible parameters space is a subset
of Rd, then classical structural system-theoretic results are, in
general, not valid [40, Section 15].
We now define a mapping between dynamical systems
in descriptor form and digraphs. Let ([E],[A],[B],[C],[D])
be a structured cyber-physical system under attack. We
associate a directed graph G = (V, E) with the tuple
([E],[A],[B],[C],[D]). The vertex set is V = U ∪ X ∪ Y ,
where U = {u1, . . . , um} is the set of input vertices, X =
3A subset S ⊆ P ⊆ Rd is dense in P if, for each r ∈ P and every ε > 0,
there exists s ∈ S such that the Euclidean distance ‖s− r‖ ≤ ε.
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Fig. 2. WSSC power system with 3 generators and 6 buses. The numerical
value of the network parameters can be found in [19].
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Fig. 3. The digraph associated with the network in Fig. 2. The self-loops of
the vertices {δ1, δ2, δ3}, {ω1, ω2, ω3}, and {θ1, . . . , θ6} are not drawn. The
inputs u1 and u2 affect respectively the bus b4 and the bus b5. The measured
variables are the rotor angle and frequency of the first generator.
{x1, . . . , xn} is the set of state vertices, and Y = {y1, . . . , yp}
is the set of output vertices. If (i, j) denotes the edge from
the vertex i to the vertex j, then the edge set E is E[E] ∪
E[A] ∪ E[B] ∪ E[C] ∪ E[D], with E[E] = {(xj , xi) : [E]ij 6= 0},
E[A] = {(xj , xi) : [A]ij 6= 0}, E[B] = {(uj , xi) : [B]ij 6= 0},
E[C] = {(xj , yi) : [C]ij 6= 0}, and E[D] = {(uj , yi) : [D]ij 6=
0}. In the latter, for instance, the expression [E]ij 6= 0 means
that the (i, j)-th entry of [E] is a free parameter.
Example 1: (Power network structural analysis) Con-
sider the power network illustrated in Fig. 2, where,
being ei the i-th canonical vector, we take [E] =
blkdiag(1, 1, 1,M1,M2,M3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), [B] = [e8 e9],
[C] = [e1 e4]
T, [D] = 0, and [A] equal to
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
a4,1 0 0 a4,4 0 0 a4,7 0 0 0 0 0
0 a5,2 0 0 a5,5 0 0 a5,8 0 0 0 0
0 0 a6,3 0 0 a6,6 0 0 a6,9 0 0 0
a7,1 0 0 0 0 0 a7,7 0 0 a7,10 a7,11 0
0 a8,2 0 0 0 0 0 a8,8 0 a8,10 0 a8,12
0 0 a9,3 0 0 0 0 0 a9,9 0 a9,11 a9,12
0 0 0 0 0 0 a10,7 a10,8 0 a10,10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 a11,7 0 a11,9 0 a11,11 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a12,8 a12,9 0 0 a12,12

The digraph associated with the structure matrices
([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) is shown in Fig. 3. 
9B. Network vulnerability with known initial state
We derive graph-theoretic detectability conditions for two
different scenarios. Recall from Lemma 4.1 that an attack
u(t) is undetectable if y(x1, u, t) = y(x2, 0, t) for some initial
states x1 and x2. In this section, we assume that the system
state is known at the failure initial time,4 so that an attack u(t)
is undetectable if y(x0, u, t) = y(x0, 0, t) for some system
initial state x0. The complementary case of unknown initial
state is studied in Section V-C.
Consider the cyber-physical system described by the ma-
trices (E,A,B,C,D), and notice that, if the initial state is
known, then the attack undetectability condition y(x0, u, t) =
y(x0, 0, t) coincides with the system being not left-invertible.5
Recall that a subset S ⊆ Rd is an algebraic variety if it
coincides with the locus of common zeros of a finite number
of polynomials [26]. Consider the following observation.
Lemma 5.1: (Polytopes and algebraic varieties) Let S ⊆
Rd be a polytope, and let T ⊆ Rd be an algebraic variety.
Then, either S ⊆ T , or S \ (S ∩ T ) is dense in S.
Proof: Let T ⊆ Rd be the algebraic variety de-
scribed by the locus of common zeros of the polynomials
{φ1(x), . . . , φt(x)}, with t ∈ N, t < ∞. Let P ⊆ Rd
be the smallest vector subspace containing the polytope S.
Then P ⊆ T if and only if every polynomial φi vanishes
identically on P . Suppose that the polynomial φi does not
vanish identically on P . Then, the set T ∩ P is contained in
the algebraic variety {x ∈ P : φi(x) = 0}, and, therefore [26],
the complement P \ (P ∩ T ) is dense in P . By definition of
a dense set, the set S \ (S ∩ T ) is also dense in S.
In Lemma 5.1 interpret the polytope S as the admissible
parameters space of a structured cyber-physical system. Then
we have shown that left-invertibility of a cyber-physical system
is a structural property even when the admissible parameters
space is a polytope of the whole parameters space. Conse-
quently, given a structured cyber-physical system, either every
admissible realization admits an undetectable attack, or there
is no undetectable attack in almost all admissible realizations.
Moreover, in order to show that almost all realizations have no
undetectable attacks, it is sufficient to prove that this is the case
for some specific admissible realizations. Before presenting
our main result, we recall the following result. Let E¯ and A¯
be N -dimensional square matrices, and let G(sE¯− A¯) be the
graph associated with the matrix sE¯ − A¯ that consists of N
vertices, and an edge from vertex j to i if A¯ij 6= 0 or E¯ij 6= 0.
The matrix s[E¯] − [A¯] is said to be structurally degenerate
if, for any admissible realization E¯ (respectively A¯) of [E¯]
(respectively [A¯]), the determinant |sE¯ − A¯| vanishes for all
s ∈ C. Recall the following definitions from [41]. For a given
graph G, a path is a sequence of vertices where each vertex
is connected to the following one in the sequence. A path is
simple if every vertex on the path (except possibly the first
and the last vertex) occurs only once. Two paths are disjoint
if they consist of disjoint sets of vertices. A set of l mutually
4The failure initial state can be estimated through a state observer [19].
5A regular descriptor system is left-invertible if and only if its transfer
matrix G(s) is of full column rank for all almost all s ∈ C, or if and only if[
sE−A −B
C D
]
has full column rank for almost all s ∈ C [34, Theorem 4.2].
disjoint and simple paths between two sets of vertices S1 and
S2 is called a linking of size l from S1 to S2. A simple path
in which the first and the last vertex coincide is called cycle;
a cycle family of size l is a set of l mutually disjoint cycles.
The length of a cycle family equals the total number of edges
in the family.
Theorem 5.2: (Structural rank of a square matrix [42])
The structure N -dimensional matrix s[E¯]− [A¯] is structurally
degenerate if and only if there exists no cycle family of length
N in G(s[E¯]− [A¯]).
We are now able to state our main result on structural
detectability.
Theorem 5.3: (Structurally undetectable attack) Let the
parameters space of the structured cyber-physical system
([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) define a polytope in Rd for some d ∈
N0. Assume that s[E]−[A] is structurally non-degenerate. The
system ([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) is structurally left-invertible if
and only if there exists a linking of size |U| from U to Y .
Theorem 5.3 can be interpreted in the context of cyber-
physical systems. Indeed, since |sE − A| 6= 0 by assumption
(A1), and because of assumption (A4), Theorem 5.3 states
that there exists a structural undetectable attack if and only if
there is no linking of size |U| from U to Y , provided that the
network state at the failure time is known.
Proof: Because of Lemma 5.1, we need to show that, if
there are |U| disjoint paths from U to Y , then there exists
admissible left-invertible realizations. Conversely, if there are
at most |U| − 1 disjoint paths from U to Y , then every
admissible realization is not left-invertible.
(If) Let (E,A,B,C,D), with |sE − A| 6= 0, be an
admissible realization, and suppose there exists a linking of
size |U| from U to Y . Without affecting generality, assume
|Y| = |U|. For the left-invertibility property we need∣∣∣∣[sE −A −BC D
]∣∣∣∣ = |sE −A| ∣∣D + C(sE −A)−1B∣∣ 6= 0,
and hence we need
∣∣D + C(sE −A)−1B∣∣ 6= 0. Notice that
D + C(sE − A)−1B corresponds to the transfer matrix of
the cyber-physical system. Since there are |U| independent
paths from U to Y , the matrix D + C(sE − A)−1B can be
made nonsingular and diagonal by removing some connection
lines from the network. In particular, for a given linking of
size |U| from U to Y , a nonsingular and diagonal transfer
matrix is obtained by setting to zero the entries of E and
A corresponding to the edges not in the linking. Then there
exist admissible left-invertible realizations, and thus the system
([E], [A], [D], [C], [D]) is structurally left-invertible.
(Only if) Take any subset of |U| output vertices, and let
|U| − 1 be the maximum size of a linking from U to Y .
Let [E¯] and [A¯] be such that s[E¯] − [A¯] =
[
s[E]−[A] [B]
[C] [D]
]
.
Consider the previously defined graph G(s[E¯] − [A¯]), and
notice that a path from U to Y in the digraph associated with
the structured system corresponds, possibly after relabeling the
output variables, to a cycle in involving input/output vertices
in G(s[E¯] − [A¯]). Observe that there are only |U| − 1 such
(disjoint) cycles. Hence, there is no cycle family of length
N , being N the size of [A¯], and the statement follows from
Theorem 5.2.
10
To conclude this section, note that Theorem 5.3 extends [28]
to regular descriptor systems with constraints on parameters.
C. Network vulnerability with unknown initial state
If the failure initial state is unknown, then a vulnerability is
identified by the existence of a pair of initial conditions x1 and
x2, and an attack u(t) such that y(x1, 0, t) = y(x2, u, t), or,
equivalently, by the existence of invariant zeros for the given
cyber-physical system. We will now show that, provided that a
cyber-physical system is left-invertible, its invariant zeros can
be computed by simply looking at an associated nonsingular
state space system. Let the state vector x of the descriptor
system (3) be partitioned as [xT1 x
T
2 ]
T, where x1 corresponds
to the dynamic variables. Let the network matrices E, A, B, C,
and D be partitioned accordingly, and assume, without loss of
generality, that E is given as E = blkdiag(E11, 0), where E11
is nonsingular. In this case, the descriptor model (3) reads as
E11x˙1(t) = A11x1(t) +B1u(t) +A12x2(t) ,
0 = A21x1(t) +A22x2(t) +B2u(t) ,
y(t) = C1x1(t) + C2x2(t) +Du(t) .
(9)
Consider now the associated nonsingular state space system
which is obtained by regarding x2(t) as an external input to
the descriptor system (9) and the algebraic constraint as output:
x˙1(t) = E
−1
11 A11x1(t) + E
−1
11 B1u(t) + E
−1
11 A12x2(t),
y˜(t) =
[
A21
C1
]
x1(t) +
[
A22 B2
C2 D
] [
x2(t)
u(t)
]
.
(10)
Theorem 5.4: (Equivalence of invariant zeros) Consider
the descriptor system (3) partitioned as in (9). Assume that, for
the corresponding structured system ([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]),
there exists a linking of size |U| from U to Y . Then, in almost
all admissible realizations, the invariant zeros of the descriptor
system (9) coincide with those of the associated nonsingular
system (10).
Proof: From Theorem 5.3, the structured descriptor sys-
tem ([E], [A], [B], [C], [D]) is structurally left-invertible. Let
(E,A,B,C,D) be a left-invertible realization.
The proof now follows a procedure similar to [43, Proposi-
tion 8.4]. Let s ∈ C be an invariant zero for the nonsingular
system (10) with state-zero direction x1 6= 0 and input-zero
direction u, that is00
0
 =
 sI − E−111 A11 −E11A12 −E−111 B1A21 A22 B2
C1 C2 D

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pnonsingular(s)
x1x2
u
 .
A multiplication of the above equation by blkdiag(E11,−I, I)
and a re-partioning of the resulting matrix yields00
0
 =
 sE11 −A11 −A12 −B1−A21 −A22 −B2
C1 C2 D

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Psingular(s)
x1x2
u
 . (11)
Since x1 6= 0, we also have x = [xT1 xT2 ]T 6= 0. Then,
equation (11) implies that s ∈ C is an invariant zero of the
θ1ω1
δ1
y2 u2θ5
δ3
ω3θ3
u1 θ4
δ2
ω2 θ2
y1
θ6
Fig. 4. In the above network, there is no linking of size 2 from the input to
the output vertices. Indeed, the vertices θ1 and ω1 belong to every path from
{u1, u2} to {y1, y2}. Two input to output paths are depicted in red.
descriptor system (9) with state-zero direction x 6= 0 and
input-zero direction u. We conclude that the invariant zeros
of the nonsingular system (10) are a subset of the zeros of the
descriptor system (9). In order to continue, suppose that there
is s ∈ C which is an invariant zero of the descriptor system (9)
but not of the nonsingular system (10). Let x = [xT1 x
T
2 ]
T 6= 0
and u be the associated state-zero and input-zero direction,
respectively. Since Ker(Psingular(s)) = Ker(Pnonsingular(s)) and
s is not a zero of the nonsingular system (10), it follows that
x1 = 0 and x2 6= 0. Accordingly, we have that
Ker
−A12 −B1−A22 −B2
C2 D
 6= {∅} .
It follows that the vector [0T xT2 u
T]T lies in the nullspace of
Psingular(s) for each s ∈ C, and thus the descriptor system (9)
is not left-invertible. In conclusion, if the descriptor system (9)
is left-invertible, then its invariant zeros coincide with those
of the nonsingular system (10).
It should be noticed that, because of Theorem 5.4, under
the assumption of left-invertibility, classical linear systems
results can be used to investigate the presence of structural
undetectable attacks in a cyber-physical system; see [41] for
a survey of results on generic properties of linear systems.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
A. An example of state attack against a power network
Consider the power network model analyzed in Example
1 and illustrated in Fig. 2, and let the variables θ4 and θ5
be affected, respectively, by the unknown and unmeasurable
signals u1(t) and u2(t). Suppose that a monitoring unit is
allowed to measure directly the state variables of the first
generator, that is, y1(t) = δ1(t) and y2(t) = ω1(t).
Notice from Fig. 4 that the maximum size of a linking from
the failure to the output vertices is 1, so that, by Theorem 5.3,
there exists a structural vulnerability. In other words, for every
choice of the network matrices, there exist nonzero u1(t) and
u2(t) that are not detectable through the measurements.6
We now consider a numerical realization of this system.
Let the input matrices be B = [e8 e9] and D = [0 0]T, the
6When these ouput-nulling inputs u1(t), u2(t) are regarded as additional
loads, then they are entirely sustained by the second and third generator.
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t1
t2
t3
ω1
ω2
ω3
Fig. 5. The velocities ω2 and ω3 are driven unstable by the signals u1(t)
and u2(t), which are undetectable from the measurements of ω1 and δ1.
measurement matrix be C = [e1 e4]T, and the system matrix
A be as in equation (1) with Mg = blkdiag(.125, .034, .016),
Dg = blkdiag(.125, .068, .048), and
L =

.058 0 0 −.058 0 0 0 0 0
0 .063 0 0 −.063 0 0 0 0
0 0 .059 0 0 −.059 0 0 0
−.058 0 0 .235 0 0 −.085 −.092 0
0 −.063 0 0 .296 0 −.161 0 −.072
0 0 −.059 0 0 .330 0 −.170 −.101
0 0 0 −.085 −.161 0 .246 0 0
0 0 0 −.092 0 −.170 0 .262 0
0 0 0 0 −.072 −.101 0 0 .173
 .
Let U1(s) and U2(s) be the Laplace transform of the attack
signals u1(t) and u2(t), and let[
U1(s)
U2(s)
]
=
[−1.024s4−5.121s3−10.34s2−9.584s−3.531
s4+5s3+9.865s2+9.173s+3.531
1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N (s)
U¯(s),
for some arbitrary nonzero signal U¯(s). Then it can be verified
that the failure cannot be detected through the measurements
y1(t) and y2(t). In fact, N (s) coincides with the null space
of the input/output transfer matrix. An example is in Fig. 5,
where the second and the third generator are driven unstable
by the attack, but yet the first generator does not deviate from
the nominal operating condition.
Suppose now that the rotor angle of the first generator
and the voltage angle at the 6-th bus are measured, that is,
C = [e1 e12]
T. Then, there exists a linking of size 2 from U
to Y , and the system (E,A,B,C) is left-invertible. Following
Theorem 5.4, the invariant zeros of the power network can
be computed by looking at its reduced system, and they are
−1.6864 ± 1.8070i and −0.8136 ± 0.2258i. Consequently,
if the network state is unknown at the failure time, there
exists vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit to affect the
network while remaining undetected. Finally, we remark that
such state attacks are entirely realizable by cyber attacks [22].
B. An example of output attack against a power network
Let the IEEE 14 bus power network (Fig. 6) be modeled as
a descriptor system as in Section II-A. Following [11], let the
measurement matrix C consist of the real power injections at
all buses, of the real power flows of all branches, and of one
rotor angle (or one bus angle). We assume that an attacker
can compromise all the measurements, independently of each
other, except for one referring to the rotor angle.
Let k ∈ N0 be the cardinality of the attack set. It is known
that an attack undetectable to a static detector exists if k ≥ 4
[11]. In other words, due to the sparsity pattern of C, there
exists a signal uK(t), with (the same) four nonzero entries
G G
G
G
G
bus 1
bus 2 bus 3
bus 4bus 5
bus 6
bus 7 bus 8
bus 9
bus 10bus 11
bus 12
bus 13 bus 14
Fig. 6. For the here represented IEEE 14 bus system, if the voltage angle
of one bus is measured exactly, then a cyber attack against the measurements
data is always detectable by our dynamic detection procedure. In contrary, as
shown in [11], a cyber attack may remain undetected by a static procedure if
it compromises as few as four measurements.
R1
R2
T2
T1
T3P1
P2
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
u2
u1
u3
S7
Fig. 7. This figure shows the structure of the EPANET water supply network
model # 3, which features 3 tanks (T1, T2, T3), 2 reservoirs (R1, R2), 2 pumps
(P1, P2), 96 junctions, and 119 pipes. Seven pressure sensors (S1, . . . , S7)
have been installed to monitor the network functionalities. A cyber-physical
attack to steal water from the reservoir R2 is reported. Notice that the cyber-
physical attack features two state attacks (u1, u2) and one output attack (u3).
at all times, such that DuK(t) ∈ Im(C) at all times. By
Theorem 4.3 the attack set K remains undetected by a Static
Detector through the attack mode uK(t). On the other hand,
following Theorem 4.5, it can be verified that, for the same
output matrix C, and independent of the value of k, there
exists no undetectable (output) attacks for a dynamic monitor.
It should be notice that this result relies on the fact that the
rotor angle measurement is known to be correct, because, for
instance, it is protected using sophisticated and costly security
methods [1]. Since the state of the IEEE 14 bus system can
be reconstructed by means of this measurement only (in a
system theoretic sense, the system is observable by measuring
one generator rotor angle), the output attack Du(t) is easily
identified as Du(t) = y(t)−Cxˆ(t), where xˆ(t) = x(t) is the
reconstructed system state at time t.
C. An example of state and output attack against a water
supply network
Consider the water supply network EPANET 3 linearized
at a steady state with non-zero pressure drops [44]. The water
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network model as well as a possible cyber-physical attack are
illustrated in Fig. 7. The considered cyber-physical attack aims
at stealing water from the reservoir R2 while remaining unde-
tected from the installed pressure sensors S1, . . . ,S7. In order
to achieve its goal, the attacker corrupts the measurements of
sensor S1 (output attack), it steals water from the reservoir R2
(state attack), and, finally, it modifies the input of the control
pump P2 to restore the pressure drop due to the loss of water in
R2 (state attack). We now analyze this attack in more details.
Following the modeling in Section II-B, an index-one de-
scriptor model describing the evolution of the water network
in Fig. 7 is computed. For notational convenience, let x1(t),
x2(t), x3(t), and x4(t) denote, respectively, the pressure at
time t at the reservoir R2, at the reservoir R1 and at the
tanks T1, T2 and T3, at the junction P2, and at the remaining
junctions. The index-one descriptor model reads as
x˙1(t)
Mx˙2(t)
0
0
 =

0 0 0 0
0 A22 0 A24
A31 0 A33 A34
0 A42 A43 A44


x1(t)
x2(t)
x3(t)
x4(t)
 ,
where the pattern of zeros is due to the network interconnec-
tion structure, and M = diag(1, A1, A2, A3) corresponds to
the dynamics of the reservoir R1 and the tanks T1, T2, and
T3. With the same partitioning, the attack signature reads as
B = [B1 B2 0] and D = [0 0 D1], where
B1 =
[
1 0 0 0
]T
, B2 =
[
0 0 1 0
]T
, and
D1 =
[
1 0 . . . 0
]T
.
Let the attack u2(t) be chosen as u2(t) = −A31x1(t). Then,
the state variables x2, x3, and x4 are decoupled from x1.
Consequently, the attack mode u1 does not affect the dynamics
of x2, x3, and x4. Let u1(t) = −1, and notice that the
pressure x1(t) decreases with time (that is, water is being
removed from R2). Finally, for the attack to be undetectable,
since the state variable x1 is continuously monitored by S1,
let u3(t) = −x1(t). It can be verified that the proposed
attack strategy allows an attacker to steal water from the
reservoir R2 while remaining undetected from the sensors
measurements. In other words, the attack (Bu(t), Du(t)), with
u(t) = [uT1 (t) u
T
2 (t) u
T
3 (t)]
T, excites only zero dynamics for
the water network system in Fig. 7.
We conclude this section with the following remarks. First,
for the implementation of the proposed attack strategy, neither
the network initial state, nor the network structure besides A31
need to be known to the attacker. Second, the effectiveness
of the proposed attack strategy is independent of the sensors
measuring the variables x3 and x4. On the other hand, if
additional sensors are used to measure the flow between the
reservoir R2 and the pump P2, then an attacker would need
to corrupt these measurements as well to remain undetected.
Third and finally, due to the reliance on networks to control
actuators in cyber-physical systems, the attack u2(t) on the
pump P2 could be generated by a cyber attack [22].
VII. CONCLUSION
For cyber-physical systems modeled by linear time-invariant
descriptor systems, we have analyzed fundamental limitations
of static, dynamic, and active attack detection and identifi-
cation monitors. We have rigorously shown that a dynamic
detection and identification monitor exploits the network dy-
namics and outperforms the static counterpart, while requiring,
possibly, fewer measurements. Additionally, we have shown
that active monitors have the same limitations as passive
dynamic monitors. Finally, we have described graph theoretic
conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable
attacks. These latter conditions exploit the system intercon-
nection structure, and they hold for almost all compatible nu-
merical realizations. In the companion paper [39] we develop
centralized and distributed attack detection and identification
monitors.
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